翻訳と辞書
Words near each other
・ History of Valle d'Aosta Calcio
・ History of Valledupar
・ History of Vancouver
・ History of Vancouver Whitecaps FC
・ History of Vanuatu
・ History of variational principles in physics
・ History of veganism
・ History of vegetarianism
・ History of vehicle registration plates of the Philippines
・ History of Velbert
・ History of Venezuela
・ History of Venezuela (1830–1908)
・ History of Venezuela (1908–58)
・ History of Venezuela (1948–58)
・ History of Venezuela (1958–99)
History of Venezuela (1999–present)
・ History of Venice
・ History of Vermont
・ History of Verona
・ History of veterinary medicine in Pennsylvania
・ History of veterinary medicine in the Philippines
・ History of VFX in Indian Films
・ History of vice in Texas
・ History of Victoria
・ History of video games
・ History of videotelephony
・ History of Vienna
・ History of Vietnam
・ History of Vietnam during World War I
・ History of Vietnam since 1945


Dictionary Lists
翻訳と辞書 辞書検索 [ 開発暫定版 ]
スポンサード リンク

History of Venezuela (1999–present) : ウィキペディア英語版
History of Venezuela (1999–present)

Venezuela under the presidency of Hugo Chávez from 1999 to 2013 has seen sweeping and radical shifts in social policy, moving away from the government officially embracing a free market economy and neoliberal reform principles and towards socialist income redistribution and social welfare programs. Chávez has just as radically up-ended Venezuela's traditional foreign policy. Instead of continuing Venezuela's past support for American and European strategic interests, Chávez promoted alternative development and integration paradigms for the Global South. Chávez's presidency ended when he died on 5 March 2013.
==Background: 1970–1992==
Hugo Chávez's political activity began in the 1980s and 1990s, a period of economic downturn and social upheaval in Venezuela.〔On the economic and social situation: Lander, pp 21–25; McCaughan, pp 31–34; ''The Militant'', 21 December 1998.
〕 Venezuela's economic well-being fluctuated with the unstable demand for its primary export commodity, oil. Oil accounts for three-quarters of Venezuela's exports, half of its government's fiscal income, and a quarter of the nation's GDP.〔Venezuela Information Office, "A More Just Foreign Policy?" (see Sources section) p 67.

The 1970s were boom years for oil, during which the material standard of living for all classes in Venezuela improved. This was partly due to the ruling AD and COPEI parties' investing in social welfare projects which, because of the government's oil income, they could do without heavily taxing private wealth.〔"The upper and middle classes did not see their ever-increasing levels of consumption and cosmopolitain cultural orientation as threatened by popular demands, since state income continued to rise. Expanded education, health, and public works expenditure did not depend on taxing private wealth." – Lander, p 21.
〕 "Venezuelan workers enjoyed the highest wages in Latin America and subsidies in food, health, education and transport."〔McCaughan, p 31.〕 However, "toward the end of the 1970s, these tendencies began to reverse themselves."〔Lander, p 22.〕
Per capita oil income and per capita income both declined, leading to a foreign debt crisis and forced devaluation of the bolivar in 1983.〔 The negative trend continued through the 1990s. "Per capita income in 1997 was 8 percent less than in 1970; workers' income during this period was reduced by approximately half."〔 "Between 1984 and 1995 the percentage of people living below the poverty line jumped from 36 percent to 66 percent, while the number of people suffering from extreme poverty tripled, from 11 percent to 36 percent."〔McCaughan, p 32.〕
Along with these economic changes came various changes in Venezuelan society. Class division intensified, as summarised by Edgardo Lander:〔Lander, p 22〕

A sensation of insecurity became generalized throughout the population, constituting "an emerging culture of violence. . . very distinct from the culture of tolerance and peace that dominated Venezuelan society in the past." (Briceño León et al., 1997: 213). Along with unemployment, personal safety topped the problems perceived as most serious by the population. Between 1986 and 1996 the number of homicides per 10,000 inhabitants jumped from 13.4 to 56, an increase of 418 percent, with most of the victims being young males (San Juan, 1997: 232–233). Countless streets in the middle- and upper-class neighborhoods were closed and privatized; increasingly, bars and electric fences surrounded houses and buildings in these areas. The threat represented by the "dangerous class" came to occupy a central place in the media – along with demands that drastic measures be taken, including the death penalty or direct execution by the police.

During this period, the prospect of a reasonably comfortable life for most Venezuelans, which had appeared attainable in the 1970s, became increasingly remote; poverty and exclusion appeared inescapable for many. According to Lander:〔Lander, p 23〕

These crises-like conditions increasingly became permanent features of society. We are dealing here not with the exclusion of a minority categorized as "marginal" in relation to society as a whole but with the living conditions and cultural reproduction of the great majority of the population. The result was the development of what Ivez Pedrazzini and Magalay Sánchez (1992) have called the "culture of urgency." They describe a practical culture of action in which the informal economy, illegality, illegitimacy, violence and mistrust of official society are common. Alejandro Moreno (1995) characterizes this other cultural universe as the popular-life world that is ''other'', different from Western modernity – organized in terms of a matriarchal family structure, with different conceptions of time, work, and community, and a ''relational'' (community-oriented) rationality distinct from the abstract rationality of the dominant society. This cultural context is scarcely compatible with the model of citizenship associated with liberal democracies of the West.

On the political front, the AD's Carlos Andrés Pérez became president in 1989 on a platform of anti-neoliberalism, describing International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment recipes as "''la-bomba-sólo-mata-gente''" – the bomb that only kills people.〔McCaughan, p 32〕 However, shortly after attaining office, Pérez, "faced with a severe crisis of international reserves, fiscal as well as trade and balance-of-payment deficits, and an external debt ($34 billion〔''The Militant'', 21 December 1998.〕) that under these conditions could not be paid," signed a letter of intent with the International Monetary Fund stipulating that he carry out a neoliberal adjustment program that entailed privatisation, deregulation, and the dismantling of social welfare programs and subsidies.〔The quote is from Lander, p 25. On the IMF program, McCaughan p 32.

The agreement was not submitted to parliamentary consultation and was made public only after having been signed.〔Lander, p 25〕 On 25 February 1989, the government announced an increase in gasoline prices, and two days later a public transit price rise precipitated the ''Caracazo'', a series of mass demonstrations and riots in Caracas and Venezuela's other principal cities.〔Lander, p 25, says "the principal cities of the country."〕 Pérez suspended civil rights and imposed martial law. The military's suppression of the rebellion resulted in, by the government's own admission, 300 deaths; and others estimate the toll at more than 1000.〔Mc Caughan, p 34; Lander, p 25; ''The Militant'', 21 December 1998.〕

抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア(Wikipedia)
ウィキペディアで「History of Venezuela (1999–present)」の詳細全文を読む



スポンサード リンク
翻訳と辞書 : 翻訳のためのインターネットリソース

Copyright(C) kotoba.ne.jp 1997-2016. All Rights Reserved.